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Messianic-City: Ruins, Refuge and
Hospitality in Derrida
Puspa Damai

The Heart of the City
‘‘Listen first to those who, like myself, did not have to watch
TV to know that SOME of L.A. was burning,’’ Derrida wrote to a
newsletter in response to the riots triggered by the Rodney King
events in 1992, adding, ‘‘L.A. is not anywhere, but it is a singular
organization of the experience of ‘anywhere’’’ (‘‘Faxitexture’’ 28).
At a time when one hardly needs to watch TV to know that many
cities around the world are burning, or are targeted and wounded,
bombed and invaded—as if the Biblical injunction, ‘‘Then ye shall
appoint you cities to be cities of refuge for you’’ had turned against
itself, or had suspended itself, thereby converting cities of refuge
into sites of intense hostility—it would be pertinent to recall the
many illuminating texts Derrida has composed on cities and how
deconstruction is inextricably related to burning, cinders, ashes,
ruins, haunting, dissemination and destruction, and at the same
time to rebuilding, inheriting, maintaining (maintenant), opening,
reconstructing and welcoming. At the same time, it is precisely his
evocation of the city as a place of refuge modeled after a certain
messianicity, if not messianism, that exposes his own texts to a rigorous rethinking and critique. A number of fascinating readings
have been done on Derrida’s concept of hospitality, yet hardly anything has been written on the theme of the city in Derrida, even
Discourse, 27.2 & 27.3 (Spring and Fall 2005), pp. 68–94.
Copyright 䉷 2007 Wayne State University Press, Detroit, Michigan 48201-1309.
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though it is not difficult to see that for Derrida cities represent
what his seminar on hospitality calls the very ‘‘structures of welcoming [les structures de l’accueil]’’ (Acts of Religion 361). After
looking closely at the direct as well as oblique references to cities
which traverse Derrida’s work like traces that radically erase themselves while presenting themselves, it would not be an exaggeration to claim that one has not quite approached deconstruction if
one has not yet visited Derrida’s concept of the city. It should be
recalled that Derrida in Dissemination refers to a radical anteriority
explicitly in terms of the city when he talks about a tower that
‘‘occupies a place before ‘me,’’’ and like a sentence that awaits
me, keeps watch over me and ‘‘surveys my heart’s core—which is
precisely a city, a labyrinthine one’’ (341, italics added).
On the one hand Derrida’s city is split—like Jean-Luc Nancy’s
‘‘heart,’’ which Nancy says does not exist before the break, for ‘‘it
is the break itself that makes a heart’’ (99)—into the tower and
the labyrinth, whose destiny is decided by the tower. On the other
hand, however, the ‘‘heart,’’ which is one of the most recurring
themes in Derrida, and which he characterizes by using ‘‘city’’ as a
trope, ironically evokes unicity, even an essence. The oneness or
ipseity of the heart in Derrida becomes obvious when, in The Gift of
Death, he prophesies that the future belongs to the heart insofar as
the heart is ‘‘a place of treasures,’’ the treasures to come, treasures
one saves ‘‘beyond the economy of the terrestrial visible or sensible,’’ or the priceless treasures of the ‘‘celestial capital’’ (98). In
‘‘Che cos’è la poesia?’’ Derrida returns to this theme to argue that
poetry is a dictation from the other that is lost ‘‘in anonymity, between city and nature’’; and the secret of this dictation from the
other that remains im-presentable can only be learned by heart
(223). A poem, Derrida continues, is ‘‘what teaches the heart, invents the heart’’ but the invention that causes the heart beat lies
‘‘beyond oppositions, beyond outside and inside’’ (231). Again, in
For What Tomorrow, Derrida evokes the ‘‘heart’’ while analyzing the
problem of sovereign monopoly over the death penalty, arguing
for the unconditional abolition of the death penalty both for reasons of principle (rather than utility or inutility) and for reasons of
the heart (89–90), as if the reasons of the heart had been deployed
to counter the reasons of the head, or in other words, sovereignty
as being ‘‘head’’ of the State.
Contrary to Henri Lefebvre’s critique that deconstruction and
poststructuralism conceptualize space as merely a mental thing or
a mental place (Production 3–4), the question of the city brings
deconstruction to the ‘‘ground realities,’’ by foregrounding the
political dimension of Derrida’s thinking. For instance, Derrida’s
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text, On the Name, examines Plato’s concept of khōra, in which Derrida interprets khōra not as a mental space but as a shifting receptacle that makes a city go outside of itself or exposes it to the other
as if the memory of one’s city had been imprinted by ‘‘the secretariat of another city’’ (114, 118). A city, which is at once more than
one and less than one, insofar as it subsists only by going outside
of itself towards the other, is not merely the houses, the monuments and the habitat, or to put it otherwise, is not something that
can be calculated in terms of its monuments; instead it is the polis
where all political decisions are made, a site where all historical
events take place and an event that makes the arrival of the other
possible. In fact, for Derrida a city embodies the figure of the other
itself, the other which, with its visitation that exceeds all expectations, opens itself as hospitality. The city in Derrida functions almost in the same way as does language in the work of Emmanuel
Levinas, whose concept of hospitality to the Other—as seen especially in his remarks in Totality and Infinity that ‘‘the essence of
language is friendship and hospitality’’ (305)—provides Derrida
an important point of departure for his own concept of cosmopolitan hospitality.
It is precisely Derrida’s concept of the city of refuge grounded
on the law of incalculable or unconditional hospitality to the other
or on the principle of the heart—which is not a normative principle, not even a quasi-normative one—which provides a vantage
point to show how Derrida’s project of the city of refuge is conditioned by a number of theoretical constraints. I will point out at
least four areas—not only to continue with the spatial metaphor
but also to suggest that Derrida’s cosmopolitics of the city eventually culminates in the politics of ‘‘areas’’ in which one area is posited over against the rest—each inextricably related to the other
and yet unique, which register and reveal these constraints. The
first is his notion of tradition or heritage that determines both the
conditions of the inheritance and the question of who inherits it.
The second area is Derrida’s characterization of the arrival of the
other without which neither hospitality nor any event would be
possible: on close inspection, the way in which the other’s arrival
is theorized as an unconditional visitation, as opposed to an arrival
by invitation, reveals that Derrida’s notion of the unconditional
itself belongs to a discourse that is already conditioned by a set of
invariables. The messianic event of the arrival of the other is the
third area that conditions Derrida’s concept of the unconditionally hospitable city. Although distinguished from messianism, this
concept nonetheless unmistakably evokes theology, albeit a negative one, thereby bringing, as if in a loop, Derrida’s critique of
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sovereignty back to the onto-theological tradition from which he
wants to distinguish his principle of the heart or the messiani-city.
And finally, the last area in which a constraint can be identified is
the centrality of Derrida’s notion of the ‘‘other’’ Europe in his
references to cities, which interestingly revives a universalist project of the new Europe in spite of his assurance that this ‘‘other’’
Europe is not limited to any fixed borders, or that it is in the process of constant making and remaking, thereby turning these Europeans ‘‘at once youthful and tired of [their] age’’ (The Other 7).
All of these constraints that condition Derrida’s unconditional
hospitality eventually bear on the question of sovereignty, and I
claim that Derrida’s project of the city of refuge fails to theorize
the other of sovereignty, for it is already conditioned by the sovereignty of the other. By the other of sovereignty I do not mean, as
if following a path paved by Foucault in Society Must Be Defended,
that ‘‘we have to bypass or get around the problem of sovereignty’’
(27). Bypassing sovereignty would be impossible, as Derrida cautions in Rouges, because evading it would threaten ‘‘the classical
principles of freedom and self-determination’’ (158). Derrida indeed handles the question of sovereignty with more subtlety than
does Foucault with the latter’s impatient bypassing. Against the
classical conceptualization of sovereignty as expressed so volubly
and indivisibly, for instance, in the Leviathan, where Hobbes argues
that whether sovereignty resides in one as in monarchy, or in many
as in autocracy, or in all as in democracy, sovereignty requires that
they must have it entirely (123), or in Bodin’s On Sovereignty where
sovereignty is defined as an absolute and perpetual power of the
prince that cannot be transferred in any other ways than as an
unconditional gift (8), Derrida maintains that sovereignty should
remain at once indivisible yet to be shared. Nevertheless, the question persists as to the nature of this sharing (partage), for it is also
the unconditional gift of sovereignty that constitutes the law of
the unconditional in Derrida; and the whole deconstruction of the
classical notion of sovereignty seems merely to reverse the order
of the sovereign. Instead of claiming the sovereignty of the self, or
ipseity, Derrida seems to revert it to the sovereignty of the other.
The circular wheel of sovereignty that receives a measured pounding in the first chapter of Rouges—where Derrida adroitly exposes
the circularity of sovereignty as ‘‘a rounding off ’’ by the self, or as
a turn (tours) around the self (12)—only comes full circle in order
to reaffirm the unicity of the heart of the city.
Derrida’s project of the city in general and, in particular, that
of the city of refuge, which he sketches out in his address to the
International Parliament of Writers in Strasbourg in 1996 (later
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published in On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness), is a pertinent site
for pursuing this reversal because these projects seem—against his
express wish not to put forward any plan or proposition, and to
strictly maintain ‘‘the essential poverty of [his] work’’ (‘‘Hospitality’’ 74)—to chart out an ambitious plan for a network of cities of
asylum for victims of state persecution. The Cities of Asylum network, established under the auspices of the International Parliament of Writers, of which Derrida was a founding member and
vice president, is not a utopic vision. As we are informed by Christian Salmon in the first issue of the Parliament’s Journal, Autodafe,
the Parliament convened in haste after the assassination of Tahar
Djaout in Algeria in 1993, and Salman Rushdie and Wole Soyinka
were its first two presidents. And from the moment of its creation,
it has been involved in setting up a network of Asylum Cities that
offer refuge to writers and artists threatened by fundamentalist
and totalitarian regimes. ‘‘Five years after its creation,’’ Salmon
continues, ‘‘there are thirty cities in this network’’ including Barcelona, Frankfurt, Salzburg, and Venice (13). In his address to the
Parliament, Derrida characterizes the cities of refuge as ‘‘free and
autonomous cities,’’ but their autonomy does not correspond to
the classical notion of autonomy as indivisible sovereignty; instead
it invokes ‘‘an original [inédit] concept of hospitality’’ (5) which
proposes the ‘‘Law of an unconditional hospitality, offered a priori
to every other’’ (On Cosmopolitanism 22). In other words, the autonomy of a city of refuge would initiate an implosion of classical
sovereignty and an emergence of a new concept of shared sovereignty. Derrida proposes the implosion and emergence at a number of levels, of which perhaps the most consequential is the
destabilization of the topological and political unity of the polis,
which he splits into two: the City and the State. While the traditional theory of sovereignty, that of Carl Schmitt, for instance,
seeks to keep the unity of the polis intact by safeguarding what
Schmitt’s Political Theology calls the State’s ‘‘monopoly to decide’’
(13), Derrida, on the contrary, seeks to dissociate the City from
the State in order to bring the former out of the shadow of the
monopolistic sovereignty of the latter, and to endow the city with
more autonomy and sovereignty.
Another event of this shared sovereignty occurs in Derrida’s
interrogation of the classical notion of the sovereign being who
decides on the exception, as formulated by Carl Schmitt in Political
Theology (5). Against the secularized theological and ontological
legacy of sovereignty of which Schmitt is only one of the heirs,
Derrida maintains that a decision, if such a thing is possible, cannot and should not be made by me; rather it is always the other
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who decides, leaving me, the subject, in the wake to bear responsibility for his decision (‘‘Hospitality’’ 67). In other words, the event
of decision embodies a shared—or, to use Derrida’s favorite term,
spectral—sovereignty which is divided between the other and myself, and in which the other, who overwhelms me, is not a presence
but an apparition. Thus, by conceptualizing the city as a threshold
between two forms of the polis, or between the norm and the decision, Derrida conjures a site in which sovereignty implies a decision that exceeds the economy of one’s ipseity or an experience of
the haunting of the other beyond the exchanges of intersubjectivity. On the basis of his concept of the shared sovereignty of the
city, Derrida succeeds in envisioning a new cosmopolitics beyond
the sovereignty of nation-states and even beyond the discourse of
world-government or its analogies in the form of world-cities or
globalicities, to which even the most serious discussions on cosmopolitanism are confined. Even though Saskia Sassen, one of the
most cited exponents of global cities, thinks that global cities are
command points in the organization of a world economy (4), her
project nonetheless does not seek to dissociate cities from the neocolonial politics of the wealthy nations. It is important to remember, as Spivak reminds us, ‘‘why Kabul—behind it Gaza, Karachi,
Ulan Bator and bien d’autres encore—cannot emerge as global
cities’’ (74).
The cities of asylum, however, are neither anti-State nor paraState ‘‘structures’’; rather, they call for a rethinking of political belonging that tends, beyond the State, toward what Bataille in The
Absence of Myth calls ‘‘the absence of community’’ (96), or what
Derrida in Politics of Friendship refers to as ‘‘friendship without the
community of the friends of solitude’’ (42). Derrida would agree
with Bataille when the latter says that ‘‘[w]ithin me there is only
the ruin of sovereignty’’ (96), but he would depart from Bataille’s
notion of sovereignty as a ‘‘state of collapse,’’ which Bataille compares with the insubordination of the starry sky, to point out, as he
does in the above-cited passage in Dissemination, that there is a
tower that keeps watch over ‘‘me’’ and surveys the core of ‘‘my’’
heart. In other words, for Derrida a city is not only the embodiment of the other, it is also a space held hostage by the other. That
is to say, Derrida does not only revise traditional sovereignty by
dividing it between the subject and the other, between the norm
and the decision, and between the City and the State, but he also
maintains that the other is singularity itself, and the event of the
other’s arrival is exceptional. Insofar as the city of refuge is unconditionally open to the arrival of the other, and insofar as the singular event of the other’s arrival exceeds all laws of hospitality, the
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city becomes a site of the ‘‘radical evil’’ itself. In Acts of Religion,
Derrida relates radical evil with the messianic, which he distinguishes from messianism. Messianicity or what I am calling here
the ‘‘messianic-city’’ ‘‘exposes itself to the absolute surprise’’ of
the unconditional arrival of the other (56). A city of refuge is unthinkable without the fear and trembling generated by this radical
evil. In this sense, the tremor caused in the city and by the city, for
Derrida, is more hostile than is denoted by the conventional notion of enmity or hostility.

Identifying the Enemies of the City
Before further examining the sovereign and exceptional space
of the city of refuge that exposes us to radical evil in the process
of providing refuge from the calculative and repressive machinations of the State, we should pause first to review Derrida’s writing
on cities in general, a body of texts that somehow has eluded critical attention. The city is the protagonist in a number of texts by
Derrida that include On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness, which we
will return to later; ‘‘Point de Folie—Maintenant L’Architecture,’’
in which Derrida talks about the mad moments of ‘‘maintenant’’
(used to mean the maintenance and immediacy) of the architecture of the event; ‘‘Generations of a City,’’ in which Derrida develops the architectural logic of incompletion; ‘‘Des Tours de Babel,’’
which examines the myth of the building of the imperial Tower of
Babel and its deconstruction by God; and ‘‘Faxitexture,’’ Derrida’s
keynote address to the Anywhere Conference held in Japan in
1992, in which, by looking at the Rodney King events and the riots
that followed them, he contemplates how technology is determining the texture of the city and also how formidable a task it is
to rebuild L.A. from the ashes. Derrida’s conversations on 9/11,
published together with the interviews with Habermas in Philosophy
in the Time of Terror, revolve around the issue of terror, colonialism
and imperialism. In his analysis of the events of 9/11, Derrida expounds on the logic of ‘‘autoimmunity’’ in relation to democracy
and to his notion of the ‘‘to come’’ of the event and its traumatism.
Equally important are Derrida’s essays on Europe published as
The Other Heading: Reflections on Today’s Europe, wherein, through a
seductive play on the heading of the text, L’autre cap, he not only
revisits a tradition that sees Europe as a cape, a heartland where
the capital is concentrated, indeed as the capital city (polis) of the
world, but also deliberates on European responsibility in order to
suggest that a rethinking of sovereignty or heading is necessary
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today. Not only these later works, but also earlier texts by Derrida,
such as Of Grammatology, Margins of Philosophy, Writing and Difference,
and Dissemination, are marked with varying degrees and intensity
by the haunting question of the city. The logic of the ‘‘evil’’ or
‘‘catastrophic’’ supplement in Of Grammatology, for instance, rotates around Derrida’s critique of Rousseau’s equation between
alphabetic writing and the city. After submitting to a hairsplitting
analysis the latter’s assertion that languages are made to be spoken
and writing is nothing but a supplement of speech, Derrida—and I
summarize without attempting to reconstitute his complex critical
moves here—anchors his critique of the metaphysics of presence
in Rousseau’s notion of the sovereign city. ‘‘Praise of the ‘assembled people’ at the festival or at the political forum [in Rousseau]
is always a critique of representation,’’ writes Derrida, because the
‘‘legitimizing instance, in the city as in language—speech or writing—and in the arts, is the representer present in person,’’ which
in turn defines Rousseauean sovereignty or the Will as an impossibility of representation, or as ‘‘presence, and delight in presence’’
(296). ‘‘In all the orders,’’ he continues, ‘‘the possibility of the
representer befalls represented presence as evil befalls good, or
history befalls origin,’’ for ‘‘the signifier-representer is the catastrophe’’ itself (296).
If Rousseau’s notion of the city as catastrophe helped Derrida
critique the principle of absolute sovereignty without representation, the essay ‘‘Before the Law,’’ which reads Kafka’s story of the
same title, revisits the city in order to analyze and expose what
Derrida calls the categorical authority of law by which law presents
itself as absolute withdrawal appearing as if ‘‘without history, genesis, or any possible derivation’’ (191). As we know, Kafka’s ‘‘Before
the Law’’ relates the travails of a man from the countryside when
he goes to the city in order to seek admittance to Law. ‘‘Given his
situation,’’ Derrida writes, ‘‘the man from the country does not
know the law which is always the city’s law, the law of the cities
and edifices, protected by gates and boundaries, of spaces shut by
doors’’ (195). This law of the city, or the city as the law, quickly
erodes the distinction between before and behind, inside and outside, high and low, and now and later by annulling that ‘‘which
takes place, the event itself,’’ thereby opening itself as a topology
‘‘without its own place,’’ or as atopology (208–9). Even though
Derrida calls the atopology of law a differential topology, it seems
that the inaccessibility of law is precisely what annuls all differences
and stops all events by converting its gated city into the citadel of
the absolute sovereignty that, like sovereignty in Rousseau, tries to
resist all representation.
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It is precisely the question of the event or the opening up of
space that leads Derrida to reopen the case of dispute between
Martin Heidegger and Meyer Shapiro regarding certain shoe
paintings by Van Gogh. Heidegger claims that the pair of shoes by
Van Gogh belongs to a peasant woman; Shapiro, on the other
hand, argues that the pair belongs instead to the city dweller, or
more precisely, to the artist himself, by then a man of the city.
Heidegger identifies the shoes with ‘‘the rooted and the sedentary’’ peasant woman, and Shapiro with the city dweller, who is an
‘‘uprooted emigrant’’ (260). ‘‘According to Shapiro,’’ writes Derrida, ‘‘Heidegger has put the shoes back onto (male or female)
peasants’ feet. He has in advance, laced them, bound them on to
peasant ankles, those of a subject whose identity, in the very contour of its absence, appears quite strict’’ (275). On the other hand,
continues Derrida, by declaring that they are the artist’s shoes,
Shapiro concludes the case, and for him the ‘‘[h]earing is over,
[and the] sentence decided’’ (276). What interests Derrida is not
only the historical fact that Shapiro and Heidegger are seeking
restitution of certain shoes that have ‘‘traveled a lot, traversed all
sorts of towns and territories and wars,’’ and that have suffered
‘‘[s]everal world wars and mass deportations’’ (281). Nor is he only
concerned with the fact that the dispute is taking place on the
frame of the painting, neither entirely inside nor outside the painting, for ‘‘who is going to believe,’’ Derrida asks—without, however,
revealing that he is referring to the horrendous acts of Nazi atrocities against the Jews during the second World War, thereby accentuating the magnitude of the violence suggesting that it has no name
yet—‘‘that this episode is merely a theoretical or philosophical dispute for the interpretation of a work or The Work of art’’ (272)?
What makes him more curious is the way the verdict is reached by
the pair of professors regarding the rightful owner of the shoes,
and the interest both show ‘‘in identifying, in identifying the subject
(bearer or borne) of these shoes’’ (282). Hinting at Heidegger’s
flirtation with Nazi ideology and the subsequent condemnation of
his thoughts by his critics, Derrida writes that there is ‘‘persecution
in this narrative, in this story of shoes to be identified, appropriated,’’ and he continues that this tale is made up of who knows
‘‘how many bodies, names, and anonymities, nameable and unnameable’’ (274). By deconstructing these ‘‘persecutionary’’ narratives that seek to appropriate Van Gogh’s shoes for their own
end, Derrida argues that ‘‘there is much to discharge, to return, to
restitute’’ in the hallucinogenic shoes, or the collective hallucination that they have become (273). He accuses Heidegger and Shapiro of reducing the spectrality of the shoes, and the haunting
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space of the painting that they belong to, to the binary of the city
and the countryside, and he blames both professors for playing
out the drama of snatching the shoes ‘‘from the common enemy,
or at any rate from the common discourse of the common enemy’’
(273).
The Heidegger-Shapiro debate over identifying the subject or
the right owner of the shoes produces this common discourse of
the common or an easily identifiable—that is also to say, an always
already identified—enemy insofar as the decision of whose shoes
they are is done by the professors who pretend to know the owners
without letting the owners decide for themselves. As a result the
debate unfolds as a secret correspondence between the disputants
as their seemingly contradictory positions start to converge or resemble each other, rendering indistinguishable the borders both
between the city and the countryside and between amity and enmity. Derrida tries to trace the surplus or the ghost that returns or
remains after this circular correspondence through the logic of
the parergon, which he defines as ‘‘the exceptional, the strange,
the extraordinary’’ (58), and also as an extra ‘‘whose transcendent
exteriority comes to play, abut onto, brush against, rub, press
against the limit itself and intervene in the inside only to the extent
that the inside is lacking’’ (56).
The incursion of the exterior that remains and returns is
called in Politics of Friendship ‘‘the threat of the ruin’’ (88) against
which, Derrida argues, the discourse of the purely political enmity
in Carl Schmitt is constructed. As we know, for Schmitt, the political or the polis is grounded on the ‘‘ultimate’’ distinction between
friend and enemy (The Concept 26). If the political is to exist for
Schmitt, Derrida remarks, ‘‘one must [as in Rousseau’s city] know
who everyone is, who is a friend and who is an enemy, and this
knowing is not in the mode of theoretical knowledge but in one
of a practical identification’’ (116). The politics of identification in
Schmitt, however, must categorically avoid all other knowledge
and distinctions based on morality, economy, aesthetics, and even
religion. I may hate a person, or he may even be my enemy in the
sense of the inimicus, but that does not make him my political
enemy (hostis); we may be friends, but at the same time we may be
political enemies. From Schmitt’s apparently rigorously theoretical
distinction between inimicus and hostis, Derrida concludes that in
Schmitt’s scheme, the friend can be an enemy. That is to say, whenever ‘‘this border is threatened, fragile, porous, [and] contestable,’’ then ‘‘the Schmittian discourse collapses’’ and it is ‘‘against
the threat of this ruin’’ that Schmitt’s concept of the polis or the
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political takes form as it ‘‘defends itself, walls itself up, [and] reconstructs itself unendingly against what is to come’’ (88). Derrida’s notion of the city that commands unconditional hospitality
echoes Schmitt’s concept of the unconditional hostility of the
polis, but it differs from that concept not only because it implies
deconstruction of the binaries whereby it exceeds the ontological
premises of Schmitt’s politics of identification, but also because
Derrida thinks that the unending reconstruction of the city against
the ruin, or the conception of a sovereign city untouched by ruin,
in fact turns a city into a monument or museum or, worse, a penitentiary. Derrida’s city starts precisely where the Schmittian polis,
with its sovereign decisions on the friend and the enemy, collapses.
It is the originary principle of the collapse and the ruin that first
gives the polis and its binaries to thinking and to spatializing. The
radical evil of, or as, the city in Derrida implies an abyssal openness
to the arrival of the other, who exceeds all calculations, mechanisms or discourses of identification that reduce the other to a
common figure of the friend or the enemy. By moving from the
figure of the common to the exceptional or singular alterity, Derrida conceives of the city as a site marked by the aporetic experience in which the other’s arrival from beyond the horizon of
expectation surprises or threatens us with the radical evil. It is this
‘‘threat that must be thought,’’ as Derrida puts it in Specters of Marx,
that makes the event take place as ‘‘the ruin or the absolute ashes’’
(175).
In this sense we understand better Derrida’s remarks in Memoirs of the Blind, his reflection on the genre of the self-portrait, that
in ‘‘the beginning there is ruin’’ (68). At the origin comes ruin
not as a ground to support what follows, nor as an accident that
supervenes in the monument that was originally untouched by
ruin; ruin is what happens to the image, to self-portrait, to all projects of identification from their origin. Ruin remains or returns
from the moment of the first gaze when the portrait is given over
to the spectral gaze of the other. Even though the draftsman is
portraying himself in his self-portrait, he cannot draw without letting the spectator look back at his face; in other words, the selfportraitist cannot proceed except by letting himself be blinded by
the spectator that his work prescribes. In all the cases of the selfportrait, it is the extrinsic clue that allows identification, as if the
draftsman were drawing himself in memory of himself, in mourning for himself. It is this unheimlich moment of encounter with
the specter or the other while looking at one’s own face that constitutes for Derrida the figuration of the self-portrait as ruin. The
draftsman always draws to the dictate of the other’s gaze or voice.
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The ‘‘voice of the other orders or commands’’ (64). The event
that interrupts the ‘‘blind’’ draftsman’s self-portrait as mourning,
therefore, is the other’s sovereign command, his traumatizing and
paralyzing order or his wounding signature and stroke. The ruin
that proliferates in the wake of Schmittian sovereignty or of his
decision over the friend and the enemy exposes us to ‘‘what is to
come.’’ Thus it brings us back to a sovereign moment in which
it is, of course, not the ‘‘I’’ but the hau(o)ntological other that
commands. No wonder, therefore, that in the interview, ‘‘That
Strange Institution Called Literature,’’ Derrida calls this command
the ‘‘force of ruin’’ (53).

Cities of Ruin
Ruin is intimately related to Derrida’s concept of the cities
of refuge not simply because these cities extend hospitality to the
‘‘refuse’’ of the State, to those without papers and thus without any
legal protection. For the purpose of the argument, we can categorize Derrida’s use of ruin into three clusters. The first includes his
concept of the force of ruin that contaminates origin, in other
words, ruin corresponding to the event of deconstruction itself.
The second is his notion of wearing, tearing, coming to an end,
and haunting, which, as in Specters of Marx, he juxtaposes to the
apocalyptic and ‘‘neoevangelical’’ rhetoric of the crisis or the end
of history; or the end of the city, in the case of On Cosmopolitanism
and Forgiveness. From the beginning of his essay on cosmopolitanism, therefore, Derrida refers to the general ‘‘verdict’’ about the
end of the city (3), as if to imply that all projects about its renewal,
including his own, had to take into account the Gothic spectrality
of the city after the verdict of its demise. The third cluster consists
of his notions of aporia, arrival or event, which are described in a
number of texts as the experience of the desert of the desert,
which is not the same desert that we come across in Baudrillard’s
America, where cities are not cities but mobile deserts (223); or in
Virilio’s Panic City, where he ruminates over the acceleration of
paths as the desertification of the world (113). For Derrida the
experience of the desert is aporetic, or pathless; and out of this
pathlessness, as he argues in the essay ‘‘The Biodegradable,’’ arises
a certain force of the ruin. A desert invokes a certain ‘‘connivance
with ruin,’’ which constitutes, for him, the secret of deconstruction’s resistance. In the same essay he also responds to critics who
prophesy that deconstruction is in ruins because of its association
with controversial figures like Paul de Man. Derrida responds by
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arguing that deconstruction enjoys a certain immunity from ruin
precisely because it is more ruin than anything else. Ruining
deconstruction is improbable, he claims, not just because it is ‘‘neither a system, nor an edification,’’ but also because it is a ‘‘differential movement that passes by way of so many other texts, it has
many other places, many other resources than mine’’ (851).
It is not difficult to see how Derrida relates the autoimmunity
of ruin to the cities of refuge in which the principle of the unconditional sanctuary to the refugees is indispensable. However, it is
pertinent to examine this relationship further in order to understand how the forces of ruin and refuge are essentially interlinked
in Derrida’s concept of the city. Every structure of hegemony is
built against its own refusals, outcasts, and foreigners, or to borrow
from Mbembe’s ‘‘Aesthetics of Superfluity,’’ its superfluous or expendable life (380). Ruin is not related to a structure or a culture,
therefore also to a city, in a simple relationship of inside and outside. What is proper to a culture or a structure, reminds Derrida,
is not to be identical to itself. As he illustrates this strange relationship in slightly different contexts in The Other Heading (9–10) and
in Aporias (10), among other texts, there is no structure or city
without a difference with itself, a difference which is at once internal but irreducible to the structure. A city without a difference to
itself is possible only in the manner of the Tower of Babel before
what Derrida calls its deconstruction by God. In ‘‘Des Tours de
Babel’’ Derrida recounts how before the deconstruction of Babel,
‘‘the great Semitic family was establishing its empire, which it
wanted universal, and its tongue, which it also attempts to impose
on the universe’’ (167). What God’s intervention in imposing confusion on Babel suggests is not merely the irreducible multiplicity
of tongues; it exhibits, argues Derrida, ‘‘an incompletion, the impossibility of finishing, of totalizing, of saturating, of completing
something on the order of edification, architectural construction,
system and architectonics’’ (165). A city of refuge, in other words,
would be a city perennially touched by ruin, which, unlike the imperial tower that aspires to saturation and totalized architecture, is
in the process of constant making and unmaking. That is the reason why Derrida in ‘‘Force of Law’’ argues that ruin is not a negative thing. In contrast to the police, which he defines in the essay
as ‘‘a Dasein coextensive with the Dasein of the polis’’ or as the omnipresent figure sans figure of the police that constitutes the being
there of the polis itself, ruin is not a thing, it ‘‘hasn’t always been
there, it will not always be there, it is finite’’ (44). It is for this trace
of finitude, for the law of the ruin, even for the law itself (l’amour
du droit) that Derrida confesses his love in the essay. ‘‘What else is
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there to love anyway?’’ he asks; one ‘‘cannot love a monument, a
work of architecture, an institution as such except in an experience itself precarious in its fragility’’ (44).
The law of the city, then, imposes itself on us with a double
injunction, to save it as well as to deconstruct it. It is on the threshold of these two forces, of law and ruin, that Derrida in ‘‘Generations of a City’’ locates the dictations of the city of Prague, which
not only bears a proper name, and is older than its inhabitants,
but also acts like a ‘‘juridical person or like a person of a novel’’
by hiding his secret behind the mask (18). Derrida proposes what
he calls the ‘‘axiom of incompleteness,’’ which he traces in Kafka’s
account of the construction of a heaven-reaching tower in a city by
its inhabitants, who realize that they are too involved to leave the
city when it is threatened to be destroyed by five successive blows
of a gigantic fist. He argues that totalizing construction is catastrophic because it desires to ‘‘resolve all problems exhaustively
within the time span of a generation and not to give time and space
to future generations’’ (21). Structures of infinitude or sovereign
presence are neither transferable nor loveable, because inheritance and love require finitude, that is to say, time, space, and
death. Not to saturate architecture is to give time and space to
what is not yet present or visible in a city; in other words, it is to
take the city as a legacy and to transfer it to the generations to
come without making it completely untransferable through a totalized and imperial architecture. This, Derrida argues, is what would
be a contradictory dictation of a city like Prague, which seems to
implore that it is only the threshold of itself, so in order to guard
it and protect it, it is equally necessary to deconstruct it. ‘‘If you
leave me intact and one,’’ the injunction commands, ‘‘you will lose
me. It is necessary both to protect me and to assault me [. . .] it is
necessary both to love me and to violate me’’ (23). But Derrida
quickly adds that the dictation is particular about the manner in
which the city demands to be assaulted, and those demands, according to Derrida are: a ‘‘city must remain open to knowing that
it does not yet know what it will be’’ or respecting the principle of
non-knowledge in architectural and urbanistic science (16); in
other words, a city must not subject building and dwelling to any
techno-scientific programming at the expense of ethico-political
responsibility; but at the same time, this open and non-saturating
urban project involves constructing according to structures that
might ‘‘keep the patrimony alive [garder le patrimoine] without
reducing the city to a museum or to a monumental tomb’’ (15).
The ethico-political responsibility and the ‘‘destiny of the city [destin de la ville]’’ (17) require renunciation of the imperial Tower
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at the same time that they involve guarding the ‘‘patrimony’’ of
the city. With a plea for non-saturation, non-knowledge and nonprogramming of the city, Derrida calls for a revival of the singular
essence of the city beyond the imperial Tower. In the same breath,
he invokes the specter of the Tower in the form of a patrimony to
be carried and guarded as legacy over the generations, and he
ruins it by conditioning it with the economic discourse of sexual
hierarchy and homogeneity, thereby reinstalling the politics of
identification and the principle of perpetual and undivided sovereignty.
Guarding the patrimony of the city, one may argue, is not the
same as safeguarding patriarchal interests, insofar as the city is neither contemporaneous to its inhabitants nor reducible to the present of their relations and hierarchies. Anyone who has read ‘‘At
This Very Moment in This Work,’’ to give just one of many possible
examples in which Derrida critiques Levinas for making femininity
and sexual difference ‘‘secondary with respect to a wholly-other’’
(433), realizes the rashness in accusing Derrida of chauvinism.
Maintenance of the city in the sense Derrida uses this term in his
essay ‘‘Point de Folie,’’ as reconstruction but also as ‘‘what happens, has just happened, promises to happen to architecture’’
(324), does not remain a stranger to history, but has a different
relation with it. The event and promise of maintenant can never
happen, according to Derrida, to an already constituted us, to a
human subjectivity. ‘‘We appear to ourselves,’’ he clarifies, ‘‘only
through an experience of spacing’’; in other words, what ‘‘happens through architecture constructs and instructs this us’’; as a
result, the latter finds itself ‘‘engaged by architecture before it becomes the subject of it’’ (324). On the one hand, the city with its
spacing is what gives refuge to its inhabitants, who are not even
inhabitants before its hospitality. On the other hand, the double
injunction of the city dictates us to guard patrimony yet violate the
city so that the city remains a precarious heritage which is imposed
on its inhabitants before even they realize it. Inheritance, as Derrida explains its logic in Specters of Marx, is not a given, but a task,
which remains before us even before we know we are. ‘‘That we are
heirs does not mean that we have or we receive this or that,’’ writes
Derrida, ‘‘but the being of what we are is first of all inheritance,
whether we like it or know it or not’’ (54). Thus, by making the act
of inheritance a task that precedes the event of being the subject
of inheritance or the subject in knowledge, Derrida demystifies
ontology, the logic of being as presence. In his dissemination of
the presence of being or the subject over the generations of cities,
or over what in Specters of Marx he calls the ‘‘generations of the
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ghosts, that is to say about certain others who are not present, nor
presently living, either to us, in us, or outside us’’ (xix), Derrida
deconstructs the sovereignty of the subject that claims absolute
and indivisible power without representation. The logic of the
non-saturated city requires that it not be reduced to a program
that would convert the city into an all mapped out techno-scientific,
esthetic or socio-economic urban project; rather, its construction,
which is in fact its violation or deconstruction, must be extended
over several generations so that something like a decision would
be possible as to the nature of the city instead of building it once
and for all from the perspective of what is visible and present in the
city. The invisible non-present, however, does not imply a utopia, a
space that will be present in the future like the Promised Land.
The noncontemporaneity of the city with the living present instead
intimates a time or space which is out of joint with itself, a time
that institutes, to once again recall a charged moment from Specters
of Marx, ‘‘a dislocation in Being and time itself, a disjointure that,
in always risking the evil, expropriation, and injustice [. . .] would
alone be able to do justice or to render justice to the other as other’’
(27). Rendering justice to the other, for Derrida, is to reaffirm the
other’s absolute precedence, or to reaffirm the heterogeneity of
the one that ‘‘comes before me, before my present, thus before
any past present,’’ and for that very reason, of the one that ‘‘comes
from the future or as future: as the very coming of the event,’’
which in turn constitutes ‘‘the very condition of the present and
of the presence of the present’’ (28). No promise of the future
without the presence or the gift of this dislocation and disjointure,
without ‘‘this desert-like messianism,’’ which, for Derrida, should
remain without content and without an identifiable messiah (28).
In his essay ‘‘Faith and Knowledge,’’ he returns to this concept
of the desert and its promise, relating it to the event of dislocation,
disjointing, radical evil, and also justice, and to the other’s absolute
precedence. The desert, he writes, is ‘‘the most anarchic and anarchivable place possible,’’ which is neither an island nor the
Promised Land, but a third place ‘‘that makes possible, opens, or
infinitizes the other’’ (55). Thus, he contrasts the identifiable messiah and the Promised Land to a certain desertification and ruin
of the anarchic third place, which is ‘‘prior to any social or political
determination, prior to all intersubjectivity’’ (55), therefore more
originary than the origin itself.
But to abuse this hypothesis, as one of the interlocutors in ‘‘At
This Very Moment in This Work I Am’’ proposes regarding Levinas’s secondarization of femininity by determining the concept of
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the other as He (433–34), Derrida’s infinite other is suddenly determined as the messiah, the anointed figure of the king, that
would safeguard the patrimony of the city. The messiah, like Levinas’s ‘‘wholly other,’’ is no longer symmetrical to the binaries of
sexual, economic or even religious differences, as it belongs to the
desert of the desert or to the absolute night of non-knowledge;
yet even in his position outside of these differences, the messiah
nevertheless retains his patrimony or messianicity, and like the
God of ‘‘Des Tours de Babel,’’ who is a deconstructionist parexcellence, surprises us with his unexpected visitation. Our wait
for the revelation in the desert, writes Derrida in Acts of Religion, is
indeed about the messiah as hôte, about the messianic as hospitality, the messianic that introduces deconstructive disruption or
madness in the concept of hospitality (362). This however does
not mean that Derrida limits his discussion of the messiah to a
religious tradition even though there are multiple instances where
he seems to be doing exactly that. For example, in ‘‘Marx & Sons,’’
he chides Aijaz Ahmad for wishing to ‘‘dispense with the vast question of religion and the religious’’ (234), and warns that following
Ahmad on dispensing with the religious would be to renounce the
irreducible religiosity that commands the discourse on promise,
justice, and revolutionary commitments (234). The event of Marx,
he argues, is rooted in a European and Judeo-Christian culture,
which also means that ‘‘Marx and every ‘Marxism’ has appeared in
a culture in which ‘messiah’ means something, and this culture
has not remained local’’ (255).
Yet Derrida insists that his concept of the messianic is stripped
of all religiosity. He tries to illustrate this towards the end of The
Gift of Death, where he contrasts the economy of the Gospel of Matthew to Baudelaire’s pamphlet, ‘‘The Pagan School,’’ which, for
him, unmasks the mathematical sublime of evangelical spiritualism. Expounding on the Gospel’s injunctions, ‘‘Love thy enemies’’
and ‘‘Thine alms may be in secret, and thy father which seeth in
secret himself shall reward thee openly,’’ Derrida argues that the
Gospel’s economy is a curious one that seems to integrate noneconomy itself by preaching a passage from symmetrical love (i.e.
loving only those who love you) to love without reserve, or a passage from earthly wages to the infinite and incalculable rewards in
heaven. What this fabricated mystery of the Gospel presupposes,
writes Derrida, is that seeing in secret, God will pay back infinitely
more as God is the witness of every secret; ‘‘He shares and he
knows’’ (112). The infinitely sharing God is not what Derrida
means by the shared sovereignty, because what the infinite sharing
amounts to here is winning paradise economically; and although
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that economy renounces the earthly economy, it remains for him
a mercenary sharing.
In contrast to the ‘‘hypocrisy’’ of the Gospel, Derrida traces a
different and terrifying form of sharing in Kierkegaard’s account
of Abraham at Mt. Moriah and Melville’s story of ‘‘Bartleby, the
Scrivener.’’ Kierkegaard’s interpretation of Abraham’s sacrifice
and Bartleby’s ‘‘I prefer not to’’ both represent for Derrida a form
of sharing terrible secrets that cannot be shared. ‘‘We share with
Abraham, writes Derrida, ‘‘what cannot be shared, a secret we
know nothing about,’’ because to share a secret is not to know or
reveal the secret, ‘‘it is to share we know not what’’ (The Gift 80).
Thus this terrible secret which is sworn to secrecy cannot be transmitted from generation to generation (80), not just because Abraham does not know or possess it or because Bartleby prefers not
to share it, but because it is the secret of the other, the foreigner,
the Wholly Other (80). It cannot be subjected to the rule of generational transmission because each generation has to inaugurate
anew this event of the ‘‘absolute beginning’’ (80). Another instance of this terrifying form of sharing for Derrida is Sophocles’
Oedipus at Colonus, which Derrida analyzes in Of Hospitality. This
text emphasizes the impossibility of generational transmission or
sharing of the secret by arguing that it is the other that decides
how the secret ought to be transmitted. The other, the foreigner,
the one who encrypts himself like Oedipus at Colonus into the
desert of the desert in a far-away land, wants the secret transmitted
in one way, not the other, thereby making his host a ‘‘retained
hostage, a detained addressee’’ (Of Hospitality 107). While examining the concluding part of Oedipus at Colonus, Derrida emphasizes
this scene in which Oedipus makes Theseus privy to the secret of
the place of his death and burial on the condition that it not be
revealed to his townspeople nor to his children. But at the same
time, he urges Theseus to not forget him. Oedipus’s request neither to be forgotten nor to be stripped of the secret of the place
of his burial, writes Derrida, sounds like an injunction or a threat,
or a piece of blackmail that detains the addressee and holds him
hostage. The impossible injunction of keeping the secret as well as
sharing it ‘‘will rescue the city, will guarantee the political safety of
the city’’ (Of Hospitality 99). The other holds the key to the political
safety of the city, which is inextricable from the scene of hostage
and threat, the scene of inheritance and the interruption of the
work of mourning. In the figure of Oedipus, the transgressor,
whom Derrida repeatedly calls the foreigner, the outlaw, even the
clandestine immigrant, Derrida interrogates the scene of hospitality that is determined by the head of the family or the State, but at
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the same time, by making the secret of this clandestine immigrant
the key to the very existence of the city, he not only reinstitutes
the other as the sovereign, but also makes the figure of the messiah, together with the tradition in which ‘‘a messiah means something,’’ the sovereign principle of the city.

City of Refuge, or Cosmopolis
The question, then, is whether Derrida’s other is an absolute
foreigner to the self, to home and ipseity, or whether it is just a
determined figure of a given culture that, as he reminds, has not
remained local. How can one reconcile Derrida’s remarks in Cinders, for example, that ‘‘Cinder [is] the house of being’’‘‘ (41) with
Derrida’s insistence on messianism or the threat of ruin comfortably lodged in a culture? A subtle reversal seems to occur when
Derrida moves towards determining and identifying the other as a
foreigner or a messiah, and then towards relating the messiah to a
particular culture which he says has gone global. In The Gift of
Death Derrida points to the absolute singularity of the other by
arguing that ‘‘every other (one) is every (bit) other.’’ But this
‘‘trembling dictum’’ which he formulated to deconstruct Levinas’s
distinction between ‘‘the infinite alterity of God and that of every
human’’ (The Gift 84), turns out to be an already localized and
determined figure of the other. As in Levinas’s sudden determination (which, as we saw earlier, Derrida criticizes) of the absolute
alterity by designating it as ‘‘He,’’ a masculine pronoun Levinas
chooses in order to demonstrate ‘‘His’’ absolute precedence, Derrida’s project of the city of refuge predicated upon the unconditional arrival of the absolute other is suddenly determined as a
locality’s other. Insofar as this figure of the foreigner or messiah
belongs to the economy of the same, the fear, trembling and radical evil that this figure is supposed to evoke ironically amount to
nothing more than Derrida’s attempt, to quote his Specters of Marx
against him, at scaring himself with his own conjuration or pursuit
of someone that closely resembles him (139). This wheel of ipseity
ingeniously absorbs the other while claiming that it respects the
absolute singularity of the other, which in turn cancels out the
distance Derrida otherwise painstakingly creates between the unconditional or the shared sovereignty and the tradition of ontotheological sovereignty.
This reversal of the wheel is present nowhere as strongly as
it is in Derrida’s On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness, the text that
proposes the cities of refuge network. It opens with the question,
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‘‘Where have we received the image of cosmopolitanism from?’’
(3). What follows is Derrida’s answer to the question, an answer
which in a way asks, in turn, what lies at the head of cosmopolitanism. Throughout the text he seeks to locate the image of cosmopolitanism in the split between two forms of the City or the polis.
At this point the translation of the text is the least helpful as it
erases Derrida’s parenthesis where he puts ‘‘polis,’’ and then, as if
in order to compensate for the erasure, ‘‘de Cité’’ has been translated as the ‘‘metropolis.’’ The two forms of the polis, according
to Derrida, are la Ville and l’État, or the city and the state (Cosmopolites 11). As we know, ‘‘la Ville’’ is derived from the Latin ‘‘villa’’—
the country house, from which also comes the word ‘‘village.’’
Derrida, by locating the origin of cosmopolitanism in a village or
a country house, seems to restore it to its initial purity before the
contamination of the State. What appears to be a split here, a split
that seems to interrogate ‘‘the inviolable rule of state sovereignty’’
(On Cosmopolitanism 4), only gives way to reviving the traditional
meaning of ‘‘la ville’’ or to ‘‘restoring a memorable heritage to its
former dignity’’ (5). The dignified heritage that Derrida wishes to
restore ‘‘la ville’’ to is that of the ‘‘City of Refuge,’’ which ‘‘bridges
several traditions or several moments in Western, European, or
para-European traditions’’ (17). Once the heritage is identified as
Western, or more precisely, European, then Derrida smoothly goes
on to recall three moments from this tradition to which the city of
refuge belongs. The first of the ‘‘several traditions’’ is the Hebraic
tradition in which God in the Book of Numbers ordered Moses
to build six cities of refuge or asylum; Derrida cites two modern
philosophical texts devoted to this tradition—Refuge Cities by Daniel Payot, and ‘‘The Cities of Refuge’’ by Levinas. Then he recalls
the medieval tradition of sanctuary and auctoritas that reassert the
sovereignty of the city to determine the laws of hospitality. Finally
he goes on to ‘‘identify the cosmopolitan [cosmopolitique] tradition common to a certain Greek stoicism and a Pauline Christianity, of which the inheritors were the figures of the Enlightenment,’’
especially Kant (18–19).
On the one hand, Derrida firmly locates the origin of cosmopolitanism, and by extension, of the cities of refuge in Western or
European traditions, reminding us of the dispute over the restitution of Van Gogh’s shoes. On the other, he recalls those traditions
as they interface with religion, namely Judeo-Christianity. Any
other form of cosmopolitanism either has to correspond to this
European tradition and become a para-European tradition, or it is
simply not cosmopolitan at all. No wonder that Derrida stops right
with Kant, and for him projects of cosmopolitanisms and refuge
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are not even worth mentioning. For instance he does not bother
even to allude to Kristeva’s narrative of cosmopolitanism that starts
not with Sophocles’ Oedipus at Colonus or with Melville’s Bartleby,
the Scrivener, but with Aeschylus’s The Danaı̈des, the Egyptian native
women who were the first foreigners to seek refuge in Argos
(Strangers 42). Nor does one find any reference in Derrida to Appiah’s writings on cosmopolitanism which look at the author’s hometown of Kumasi in Ghana for the cosmopolitan currents that
include the trails of gold, salt, kola, nuts and slaves (102); or to the
project of vernacular cosmopolitanism by Sheldon Pollock et al,
which considers it an uncosmopolitan thing to positively or definitively define cosmopolitanism (1) and instead ‘‘seek[s] cosmopolitical genealogies from the non-Christian Sanskrit world’’ (6).
Would Derrida consider such worlds that trouble his neat (inédit)
origin to be worlds? Perhaps not, because, as he reminds us in
one of the texts in Negotiations, ‘‘the concept of the world gestures
towards a history, it has a memory that distinguishes it from that
of the globe, of the universe, of Earth, of the cosmos even (at least
of the cosmos in its pre-Christian meaning)’’; for Derrida, the
world begins ‘‘by designating, and tends to remain, in Abrahamic
tradition’’ and it continues to ‘‘structure and condition the modern concepts of the rights of man or the crime against humanity’’
(374–75). To talk about the world outside Abrahamic tradition
would not only be to confuse it with the globe, or with globalization—which for him is ‘‘a concept-less word’’ (Negotiations 379)
and which he corrects elsewhere as ‘‘globalatinization’’ (Acts of Religion 50)—but would also be to give in to the ‘‘more or less wornout words to talk about it—imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialisms, neo-imperialism’’ (Negotiations 376). In other words, cosmopolitanism, together with the notion of the city of refuge, retains
its concept-hood precisely because it is true to its memory and its
history or origin, whereas talking about the world in terms of imperialism or colonialism is just conceptless (that is, irrational, or
‘‘headless’’) prattling. Thus, in the name of memory, history, concept and responsibility, Derrida would at all cost maintain the link
between the world and Europe; to forgo the sovereign place of
Europe would be to jeopardize the concept of the world itself. This
is not to imply that Derrida objects to reading or engaging the
other of Europe. Recalling that he presented himself a number of
times as ‘‘the exemplary Franco-Maghrebian’’ (Monolingualism 19),
or even as the ‘‘uprooted African’’ (Who’s Afraid 103), it would be
a mistake to suggest that the other of Europe has no place in his
writing. However, what suggests itself is that the other is granted a
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place only in relation to Europe, or to the world of ‘‘Europe to
come.’’
When Derrida refers to the ‘‘terror to come’’ or the ‘‘absolute
threat’’ beyond 9/11 in his dialogues in Philosophy in the Time of
Terror, he is pointing out the threat to this—his—concept of the
European world. What is ‘‘put at risk by this [i.e. by 9/11, which is
for Derrida a suicidal act in which the threat comes from within
the U.S., from the training the U.S. provided to people like bin
Laden during the Cold War] terrifying autoimmunitary logic [. . .]
is nothing less than the existence of the world, of the worldwide
itself ’’ (98–99). A few pages later, he assures us that he points this
threat out ‘‘without any Eurocentrism’’ (116), yet at the same time,
he insists on retaining what he calls a new figure of Europe because what Europe inaugurated at the time of ‘‘the Enlightenment
(Lumières, Aufklärung, Illuminismo) in the relationship between the
political and the theological, or, rather, the religious,’’ though still
unfulfilled, ‘‘will have left in European political space absolutely
original marks with regard to religious doctrine’’ (116–17). Derrida distinguishes the religious doctrine from religion and faith
and argues that such marks can be found neither in the Arab
world, nor in the Muslim world. He goes on to claim that the Arab
Muslim world ‘‘is not a world and not a world that is one’’ (113–14,
emphasis original). Such a mark he argues is not discernible either
in the Far East or even in American Democracy.
Derrida, however, would like to see ‘‘the United States’’ separate from the world-endangering threat of American hegemony
that ‘‘dominates or marginalizes something in the U.S.’s history,
something that is also related to the strange ‘Europe’ of the more
or less incomplete Enlightenment’’ (117). It is possible to argue
that distinguishing the strange Europe has been a constant and
active impulse in the United State at least from Crevecoeur’s Letters
from an American Farmer, in which he characterized the American
as ‘‘the new man,’’ who is ‘‘either a European or the descendent of
a European; hence that strange mixture of blood’’ (69), to Richard
Rorty’s anti-anti-ethnocentrism that boasts that ‘‘we’’ liberals are
‘‘part of a great tradition,’’ citizens of ‘‘no mean culture’’ (203).
Of course, this recourse to the strange Europe does not always
produce the curative effects Derrida believes it does. Even if it did,
that would not amount to the aporetic decision of the other that,
he says, would take us beyond the sovereignty of the nation-state,
beyond the democratic sovereignty whose onto-theological foundation must be deconstructed in order to finally reconstruct ‘‘a
new figure, though not necessarily state-related, of universal sovereignty’’ (‘‘Autoimmunity’’ 115). It would rather end up, to recall
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Negotiations again, discovering ‘‘what is already there potentially,
namely, in this [European] filiation itself, the principle of its excess, of its bursting outside itself, of its auto-deconstruction’’ (376).
Thus the ‘‘new world contract’’ Derrida evokes in this text will only
faithfully implement ‘‘the best memory of this [European] heritage’’ (376). No wonder therefore that, for Derrida, the Enlightenment tradition in general, and Kant’s cosmopolitanism in particular,
represent the best memory of the heritage, as he argues in On
Cosmopolitanism, that there is still a considerable gap between ‘‘the
great generous principles of the right to asylum inherited from the
Enlightenment thinkers and from the French Revolution,’’ and
the historical reality or the effective implementation of these principles’’ (11). As a result, Derrida argues, we are ‘‘still a long way
from the idea of cosmopolitanism as defined in Kant’s famous text
on the right to universal hospitality’’ (11). What remains to come
is none other than Kant himself, the same Kant whom even Habermas finds ‘‘no longer appropriate to our historical experiences’’
(114).
Seen from this perspective, then, the concluding part of Derrida’s essay on the cities of refuge yields an interesting insight as it
implicitly repeats Derrida’s concern for the origin of cosmopolitanism. Here, Derrida writes that the other concept of the city has
not yet arrived, and concludes that if ‘‘it has (indeed) arrived [. . .]
then, one has perhaps not yet recognized it’’ (23). The ‘‘to come’’
of the city, and of democracy itself, is recognized in the essay
within a certain Kantian legacy. As in the wheel of ipseity and sovereignty, we thus return to the circularity in which what remains
to come is none other than Kant’s cosmopolitanism. The argument here is not that one should abandon, as Habermas suggests
we do, the many ghosts of Kant one encounters in Kant’s texts, but
that Derrida’s critique of Kant does not go a long way in exposing
the anthropological, colonial and racist impulses in Kant’s writings, which in turn would have helped Derrida’s own project of
hospitality to decisively move beyond Kant. Thus, in spite of his
careful distinction between Kant’s conditional hospitality and his
concept of unconditional hospitality beyond calculations and rationalizations, Derrida’s project of universal sovereignty embodied
in the autonomous city of refuge is already conditioned by his
highly calculative and selective genealogy of the city of refuge that
invariably takes us back to the new figure of Europe, or to a selected aspect of the Enlightenment tradition. What Derrida constantly refers to as the singular other is after all brought back to
the economic narrative of the same, in the same way as the nostalgic image of the pure village is evoked to limit his notion of the
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city of refuge. As his project of universal sovereignty seeks to universalize ‘‘the best memory’’ of European heritage by declaring
all critical terms like colonialism, imperialism or neo-colonialism
defunct, what recedes away from this schema is the other concept
of the city itself, leaving behind in the wake a singular image of a
villa that uncannily resembles the state that saturates and totalizes.
Contrary to Deleuze’s splitting of the city and the state (obviously
not cited by Derrida), which for Deleuze exemplifies two forms of
deterritorialization—transcendent deterritorialization of the state
as the imperial spatium and the immanent deterritorialization of the
city as the political extensio (Deleuze and Guattari, What Is Philosophy
86), Derrida’s messianic city unfolds like an imperial spatium of
the state.
Of course, one can argue that Derrida’s ‘‘imperial spatium’’ is
Europe’s expansion or universalization without imperialism in the
same way as his Kantianism is Kant’s concept of universal hospitality but without any conditions. One may further point out that
Derrida indeed critiques Kant by exposing two of his limits: first,
by determining it as a natural law, Kant makes his notion of hospitality inalienable and thus imprescriptible, thereby betraying features of ‘‘a secularized theological heritage’’ (On Cosmopolitanism
20). The danger in Kant’s secularized theology is that it cannot
rule out the possibility of infinite dispersion over the surface of the
earth because it excludes others from what is erected on the surface of the earth. Second, Kant makes hospitality ‘‘dependent on
state sovereignty’’ (22). In opposition to Kant’s rights to universal
hospitality, Derrida proposes the law of unconditional hospitality
‘‘to all newcomers, whoever they may be’’ (22), or as he puts it elsewhere, to ‘‘who or what turns up’’ before any anticipation, determination, or identification. The new city of refuge demands the
hospitality be offered to the arrivant, who may be a foreigner, an
immigrant, an invited guest, or an unexpected visitor, without any
attempt on the part of the host to determine and decide ‘‘whether
or not the new arrival is the citizen of another country, a human,
animal, or divine creature, a living or dead thing, male or female’’
(Of Hospitality 77). In other words, the city of refuge invokes the
radical evil that exposes us to the arrival of the wholly other. Yet
again as we know, radical evil is what Derrida relates to the messianic, to the promise of the other, which even though without messianism, still belongs to a culture that has not remained local.
Thus, Derrida’s notion of Europe’s expansion without imperialism
unmistakably partakes in the idiom fraught with specters of imperialism. To put it differently again, if Derrida’s project of the city of
refuge is giving to the other what cannot be given, its messianic
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nature suggests that the impossible giving that Derrida’s project of
the city implies uncannily resembles the messianist gift of a certain
Europe.
As Derrida clarifies in his Paper Machine, pure hospitality consists in welcoming the new arrivals before imposing conditions on
them, such as asking for a name or identity paper; but on the other
hand, ‘‘it also assumes that you address them, individually’’ for
‘‘[h]ospitality consists in doing everything possible to address the
other’’ (67). The address to the other, therefore, must involve inventing new norms, new idioms and new languages. Derrida at
once seems to infinitize the possibilities of that address to occur,
but at the same time by assuming the diction of a certain Europe—
‘‘why would I deny it?’’ he asks in The Other Heading, ‘‘In the name
of what?’’ (82)—of a certain messianic-city, or the sovereign city
built in the image of a pure village, he forecloses those possibilities
by imposing conditions on the arrival of the other in its own name.
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